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Abstract 
Value at Risk (VaR) is applied to investigate the potential of incentives for 
member selection in an index insuring mutual group of farmers.  Member 
selection could have far reaching implications of introducing indexed insurance in 
smallholder economies.  Results indicate that there are no incentives for member 
selection. 
Introduction 
Literature over recent years has presented indexed insurance as a promising 
alternative for financing gargantuan catastrophe risks such as earthquakes and 
hurricanes (Froot, 1997; Doherty, 1997; Lamm, 1997; Skees, 1998).  This 
literature serves as an eye opener among researchers and practitioners of 
economic development, among whom the problem of correlated risk is a 
dominant concern (Mosley, 2000; Brown and Nagarajan 2000; Patel, 2002).   
Indexed insurance contracts for many common risks that afflict many agrarian 
economies can be designed in much the same way that indexed insurance 
contracts are designed to cover earthquakes and hurricanes.  Yet 
disproportionate transaction costs owing to a miniscule scale of operation could 
inhibit individual index insurance in developing economies.  Because these risks 
are shared, however, indexed contracts covering them can also be shared. 
Objectives 
The primary objective is to investigate the sensitivity of a collectively owned index 
reinsured portfolio to individual systemic risk profiles of its composite exposure 
units.  Value at Risk (VaR) is applied to compare risk in collective portfolios that 
are derived through a strategic and successive selection of members according 
to own systemic risk exposure.  The likelihood, and nature, of member selection 
when a mutual group forms to use area index insurance contracts is then 
inferred. 
Mutual Insurance 
Non market mutual insurance is widespread in many low income economies 
where market insurance is exceptionally insufficient (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991).  It 
typically occurs in the form of numerous resource exchanges among family and 
relatives, friends and neighbors.  Mutual insurance begins when an individual 
needing to be insured against an accidental loss makes a resource transfer to 
another, a family member, friend or neighbor.  The recipient becomes an insurer, 
with an obligation of making insurance payments to the donor if the latter 
experiences a loss.  The donation, which is practically the insurance premium, is 
forgotten if the donor does not experience a loss (Victorio 2002). 
 
Various forms of rural institutions such as credit schemes are founded on the 
principle of mutual insurance.  These institutions arise when individuals who need insurance cluster together, knit by the common objective of gaining 
insurance from each other.  Variants of mutual insurance institutions, broadly 
termed microfinance and microinsurance, may arise purely from local 
organization of individuals who are moved to action by their individualized, but 
widespread, need for forms of financial services, or may be initiated by external 
concerns such as donors and non governmental organizations which recognize 
the potential for improved local risk management when commonly exposed units 
pool together.  These institutions operate in many environments, enabling many 
communities to manage adversities that are beyond the individual capacities of 
solitary individuals or households.  Village banks and village clubs make it 
possible for households and individuals in many developing economies to fairly 
smooth consumption even though financial institutions are weak. 
 
Mutual insurance is an effective means for absorbing idiosyncratic risk.   
Participants incur the costs associated with the smaller average variability of the 
loss suffered by the group instead of that of the individual variability.  However 
correlated risk must be retained unless ceding opportunities exist.  Indeed, the 
average risk in a mutual insurance group is larger than the typical participant’s 
risk if all risk is systemic.   
 
Doherty (2000) offers an extensive discussion of the risk properties of the 
distribution of the average loss of a pooled portfolio.  In particular, these 
properties derive from the individual properties and the commonalities of 
distributions of individual exposure units of the pooled portfolio.  If the variance of 
exposure unit i of the pooled portfolio of n units is σi
2, then the variance of 




The presence of common risk in the pooled portfolio is denoted by the presence 
in Equation 1 of a positive term resulting from the summed covariance term.   
When this term is zero, then the risk is totally individual, and can conceptually be 
reduced to zero simply by pooling many portfolios, i.e. enlarging n.  Equation 1 
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Equation 3 
As n becomes large the quotient 
n
n ) 1 ( −
 tends to unit, meaning that at the limit 
the last term will equal γi,jσiσj.  This term is the burden of the mutual pool when 
opportunities for transference are absent.  This term will be larger the larger are 
the γi,j terms, or the more significant are the covariant terms.  The burden is non 
existent if all risk is idiosyncratic, i.e. if Σσi,j = 0, or when all are γi,j terms are 
independently zero. 
 
In theory the mutual insurance can distribute the effect of a systemic loss in one 
period over many periods.  For example the mutual pool can use a loan to 
smooth loss intertemporally.  In practice however the intensity of loss in a given 
period could be too large for the mutual insurance to smooth it out over any 
reasonable period.  Besides, nothing stands in the way of another major systemic 
loss occurring in the portfolio before a past one is fully smoothed.  What the 
mutual pool needs is another instrument to transfer this part of risk to an external 
entity, preferably one with the potential to absorb potentially large losses, and 
one that avails surety ex ante.  Indexed insurance is a strategic medium for this 
purpose.   
Indexed insurance 
Factor indexed derivatives hold a promise to deliver insurance-type risk coverage 
for correlated risk.  Indexed insurance is benchmarked on the factors of the 
hazard so that indemnity payments can be activated by the occurrence of 
disaster.  A simple indexed insurance contract against drought may pay 
indemnities when the rainfall measured over a specific period at a selected 
station falls short of a pre specified threshold.  Similarly a commodity yield 
indexed insurance contract may pay indemnities when area yields fall short of a 
pre specified threshold.  Individuals and other entities would pay premiums well 
before the insurance period, and would be compensated according to ex ante 
defined functions if the trigger event occurs. 
 
In low income economies, where enterprises are typically small, financial 
transactions tend to be overwhelmingly high.  The simplest reason for a 
difference in the costs of financial services to small and large holdings is the 
existence of a uniform fixed cost of each financial transaction (Saito and 
Villanueva, 1981, Binswanger and Sillers, 1983).  When insuring against 
correlated risk in these economies, it may be efficient to insure the various 
mutual insurance institutions, rather than their individual participants.  A single 
indexed insurance contract can cater for the needs of multitudes of individuals 
within a locality since all participants are commonly exposed.  Moreover, since mutual insurance entities are typically effective in enabling the management of 
idiosyncratic risks among their members but are weakened by systemic risks, a 
means to strengthen them in the face of systemic risk may be what their 
dependents need most.  When it participates in indexed insurance contracts a 
mutual insurance entity can provide its members with security against systemic 
risk because these contracts present the opportunity to filter off this elusive risk 
component from the pooled portfolio.  This is ideally the concept of reinsurance. 
 
The operation of shared coverage with indexed insurance can take various 
forms.  Individuals can decide to contribute into a premium pool, and then to 
share indemnities according to their relative premium inputs.  In this arrangement 
the mutual pool is a passive vehicle through which premiums and indemnity 
payments are transferred between insurers and the insured.  A more interesting 
approach is one in which individuals generally decide to insure the mutual 
portfolio in recognition of the fact that the survival of the mutual group is more 
valuable than ensuring full private coverage for the private cost. 
 
The proposal for mutual insurance groups to transfer risk with indexed insurance 
may be complicated by the fact that not all participants are identically exposed to 
a systemic risk.  Individuals who are most exposed to the risk have the greatest 
incentives to mobilize the group to use indexed insurance.  What is not clear is 
whether those who are least or intermediately exposed will be acceptable to the 
group.  It is already established that only the portfolios exposed at above a 
certain level may reduce risk with indexed insurance when the insurance is 
applied to individual portfolios (Miranda, 1991).   
 
If the average risk in an index insured collective portfolio can be demonstrated to 
increase when a particular category of holdings is introduced, then it is arguable 
that this category of holdings is undesirable to the index insured mutual group.  
The effect of various categories of holdings on the mutual portfolio risk is 
evaluated with an application of VaR.  
 
If all mutual insurance groups are likely to adopt indexed insurance to cede 
traditionally uninsurable catastrophe risk then any category of holdings with 
perverse effects on index insured group portfolios will likely be excluded from all 
mutual insurance. This outcome would constitute a detrimental social exclusion 
of a select group of households. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
VaR is a statistical measure of possible portfolio losses.  Losses greater than the 
VaR are suffered only with a specified small probability (Linsmeier and Pearson, 
1996).  A mutual insurance will have different VaR values depending on the 
common nature of risk in its exposure unities.  Only the systemic risk is studied 
because it is the one relevant to indexed insurance.  The definition of VaR in the study is also in a way to avoid mixing up effects of risk with those of non risk 
variables, particularly the portfolio alpha. 
 
The study uses time series farm-level corn yield data from several US counties. 
From this data the systemic risk profile (exposure beta) is estimated for every 
farm, as the slope in an OLS model relating farm yield to area yield (Miranda, 
1991).  
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The data is also used to calibrate an area yield insurance index.  
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Equation 5 
where  ηt is period t indemnity outlay from the indexed contract and yc is a 
relevant critical yield in the context of participants’ definition of loss. 
A hypothetical mutual insurance group is then defined, initially comprising a 
single member. Basis for characterizing the systemic risk profile of premier 
members of a mutual insurance group, where group formation is motivated by 
the objective to collectively reinsure with an index contract, is inferred from 
Miranda (1991). A Monte Carlo simulation is then applied to estimate VaR, and to 
relate this estimate to the exclusion and inclusion of other farm holdings in the 
mutual portfolio.  The unit of analysis in the group portfolio is denominated to the 
acre so that risk statistics can be comparable across groups of different sizes. 
 
It is assumed that a unit of insurance is purchased for each participating acre.  
Thus for each acre the mutual group pays premium p, and receives indemnity ηt 
in each period t.  The overall group portfolio can thus be expressed as: 
  
Equation 6 
where k is the acreage of the typical mutual insurance participant. 
xpressed at the acre level the portfolio is: 
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Equation 7 
When the mutual group encompasses all production units in the area the 
− + = η  
Equation 8 
The study involves the last two terms in the right hand side of Equation
he function applied in estimating VaR is not the yield, rather the net reduction in 
expression simplifies further to
1: 
 
P t t y net
t y
 6.  These 
are the parts that involve indexed insurance.  The first two terms in the bracket 
comprise the non-risk yield variation across farms, and the individual specific risk 
which is typically assumed to be stochastic normal distributed.  How mutual 
insurance groups deal with these factors is not in the scope of this study.  The 
scope of the study is to investigate how the typical member’s risk is affected by 
inclusion or exclusion of select portfolios according to risk profiles.  
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P loss  
Equation 9 
As suggested by Linsmeier and Pearson (1996) the estimation of Va
                                                          
R involves 
1) generating yearly area yield as pseudo-random values assuming it to follow 
some stochastic process, e.g. a random walk, and then recovering farm yields 
according to the OLS farm models estimated from historic data (Equation 4), and 
2) treating these yields as the actual farm observations.  VaR is defined as the 
maximum loss in net yield (expressed as a proportion of historic area average) 
such that the probability of a greater loss is only 5% (or other pre-specified small 
probability). Actual estimation of VaR involves ranking the index insured 
portfolios from the least to the largest after exposing them to respective risk 
processes, and picking out the one with a 5% quantile of the distribution as the 
VaR (Manfredo and Leuthold, 1998). Farms that increase VaR in the group 
 
1 See Miranda (1991) on the E(βi). portfolio are identified as likely unacceptable members of the potential mutual 
insurance. 
 
An area yield series of 1000 years was generated as a random walk.  Individual 
farm yields were then obtained for these 1000 years according to the discussion 
above
2.  Different mutual groups were then defined from the farms in the dataset 
by defining diverse member selection criteria on the basis of individual systemic 
risk profiles.  Then VaR was calculated for each group, and compared across 




The table below presents the distribution all beta values of the 25,596 farms used 
in the study.  These values are categorized into 20 classes, each containing 5% 
of the values.  The classes are also arranged in the order of size of beta values 
reported, starting from the class with the smallest beta value exposures.   
 
 
Beta range     
Lower limit  Upper limit  Frequency 
Cumulative 
frequency 
-1.1396106 0.5178949  1279  1279 
0.5179041 0.6497053  1280  2559 
0.6497402 0.7279086  1280  3839 
0.7279106 0.7858244  1280  5119 
0.7858301 0.8323536  1280  6399 
0.8324355 0.8711896  1279  7678 
0.8712313 0.9081364  1280  8958 
0.9082352 0.9416865  1280  10238 
0.9417022 0.9747097  1280  11518 
0.9747140 1.0067516  1280  12798 
1.0067645 1.0373273  1279  14077 
1.0373374 1.0704913  1280  15357 
1.0705010 1.1052008  1280  16637 
1.1052337 1.1406595  1280  17917 
1.1406814 1.1800056  1280  19197 
1.1800064 1.2248460  1279  20476 
1.2248609 1.2804783  1280  21756 
1.2804923 1.3512082  1280  23036 
1.3512999 1.4685100  1280  24316 
1.4692209 2.8673167  1280  25596 
                                                           
2 this step was actually not done – it need not be done because the loss, which is of 





Table of statistics used to generate the VaR chart above 
 
Statistic LABEL  Group  loss 
N  number of nonmissing values, GroupLoss  1000 
MEAN  the mean, GroupLoss  11.23312713 
STD  the standard deviation, GroupLoss  17.25667604 
MAX  the largest value, GroupLoss  71.7716155 
P99  the 99th percentile, GroupLoss  56.2475562 
P95  the 95th percentile, GroupLoss  46.85813669 
P90  the 90th percentile, GroupLoss  40.76004903 
Q3  the upper quartile, GroupLoss  22.22380729 
MEDIAN the  median,  GroupLoss  0 
Q1  the lower quartile, GroupLoss  0 
MIN  the smallest value, GroupLoss  0 
 
At the 95% level the VaR for the group formed by the largest 95% beta values is 
46.86 bushels per acre.  At the 99% level the value is 56.25 bushels per acre.  
Such values will be tabulated here for various group formulations (i.e. group 
composed of the largest 90%, 85%, 70%, etc, as well as a group composed of all 
25,596 exposures.  Preliminary results indicate that the smallest VaR at both the 
95% and 99% levels is the general membership group. 
 
Discussion The supply of financial services to small investors is typically dwarfed by 
disproportionate transaction costs owing to economies of scale (Saito and 
Villanueva, 1981, Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). On this account indexed 
contracts for systemic insurance may fail to reach needy small holder economies. 
Yet systemic risk in many developing economies would be more conveniently 
addressed at the institutional level, e.g. in the microfinance portfolio, where truly 
systemic risk is aggregated. Thus economies of scale may not be so relevant 
after all, but the effect of individual exposures to the institutional portfolio risk 
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